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RAND EDISON EADS, a Minor, et al., Appellants, v. 
HARRY MARKS et al., Defendants; CREAMERIES 
OF AMERICA (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[la, lb] Pleading-Demurrer to Complaint-Amendment After De-
murrer Bustained.-Failure of complaint to allege considera-
tion for defendants' agreement not to leave dairy products or 
glass containers therefor at plaintiffs' residence except in a 
refrigerator in the house is a deficiency which might be cor-
rected by amendment, and it is an abuse of discretion to 
sustain a demun;er to the complaint without leave to amend. 
[2] Actions-Contract or Tort.-The same act may be both a tort 
and a breach of contract. 
~ [3] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Even where there is a contractual 
relationship between the parties,. a .cause of action in tort may 
sometimes arise out of the negligent manner in which the 
contractual duty is performed, or out of failure to perform 
such duty. · 
' [4] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Where a duty of care arose by reason 
of contract and plaintiff has sued in tort for breach of that 
duty, the cqntract is of significance only in creating the legal 
duty, and defendant's negligence should not be considered as a 
breach of contract, but as a tort governed by tort rules. 
[6] !d.-Contract or Tort.-An action arising from a breach' of 
promise is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty 
growing out of the contract it is ex delicto. 
[6] !d.-Contract or Tort.-An action arising from breach of a 
contractual duty is ex delictual notwithstanding that it also 
involves a breach of contract. 
[7] Id.-Contra.ct or Tort.-.A tort may grow out of or be co-
incident with a contract, and the existence of a contractual 
relation does not immunize a tort feasor from tort liability 
for his wrongful acts in breach of the contract. 
[8] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Contractual negligence ordinarily gives 
rise to an action either on contract or in tort, and the injured 
party may at his election waive the contract and sue in tort, or 
waive the tort and base his action on the contract alone. 
[9] !d.-Contract or Tort.-Actions based on negligent failure to 
perform contractual duties, although containing elements of 
[8) See Cal.Jur.2d, Actions, §§ 29, 30; Am.Jur., Actions, §55. 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Pleading, § 103(2); [2-9] Actions, 
§15; [10) Negligence, §108; [ll] Negligence, §16]; [12] Negli-
gence, § ll2. 
I 
I 
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both contract and tort, are generally regarded as delictual 
actions, since negligence is considered the gravamen of the 
action. 
[lOa., lOb] Negligence- Pleading- Proximate Oa.use.-Complaint 
alleging that defendants agreed not to leave dairy products or 
glass containers therefor at plaintiffs' residence except in n 
refrigerator in the house, that defendants negligently left a 
glass container on the back porch of such residence, and thnt 
plaintiff minor child picked up such container and fell off the 
porch, suffering severe and permanent injuries, sufficiently 
alleges that defendants' negligence was the proximate cause 
of the child's injuries, since the child's independent intervening 
action was readily foreseeable and should have been antici-
/ 
pated. . 
[11] !d.-Proximate Cause-Intervening Oa.uses.-Where an inter-
vening act is reasonably foreseeable, the chain of causation is 
not broken, and the original actor re~ains liable. 
[12] Id.-Plea.ding-Amendment.-In action for injuries sufferPd 
by minor child because of breach of duty gro~g out of de-
fendants' agreement not to leave dairy products or containers 
therefor at plaintiffs' residence except in a refrigerator in the 
house, where the uncertainties in the complaint might be · 
obviated by amendment, it was an abuse of discretion to sus-
tain a demurrer to ~he complaint without leave to amend. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of Los 
Angeles Oounty. William B. McKesson, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
defendants reversed. 
Robert H. Green for Appellants. 
Jennings & Belcher and George M. Henzie for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs, Rand Edison Eads, a 2-year-old 
minor child, through his father and guardian ad litem, Harold 
Madison Eads, and Harold Madison Eads, sued defendant 
Creameries of America (sued as Doe One) for damages for 
personal . injuries allegedly suffered by said minor child be-
cause of the negligence of defendant, its agents, servants and 
employees. 
Defendant's (Creameries of America) general and special· 
demurrer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint was sustained 
[11] See Oa.l.Jur., Negligence, § 17; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 67. 
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without leave to amend and judgment thereon was entered in 
favor of defendant. 
In plaintiffs' amended complaint it was alleged (in part): 
"That at all times from on or about December 20, 1947, con-
tinuously to August 12, 1949, the plaintiffs, Harold Madison 
Eads, and (sic) been and was a customer of defendants, and 
at all times there had been a delivery service maintained and 
conducted by defendants wherein defendants had supplied 
and delivered to plaintiffs at plaintiffs' said place of resi-
dence, milk, cream, butter, eggs and other dairy products 
for a valuable consideration and a:t the prices established by 
defendants therefor. 
''That on or about December 1, 1948, at which time the 
said plaintiff, Rand Edison Eads, was of the approximate 
·age of one year, the defendants and each of them were in-
fanned by the plaintiff, Harold Madison Eads, and by Lenore 
Eads, the wife of said plaintiff, that no dairy products, glass 
containers, milk or milk bottles were to bt~left at the said resi-
dence of plaintiffs except in the refrigerator in the house, 
and that all empty milk bottles and glass containers for the 
defendants would be left within the house. That at said time 
plaintiff, Harold Madison Eads, and his said wife informed 
the defendants that if said dairy products or the containers 
therefor were left within the reach of the minor child that 
said minor child might be injured by picking up, -dropping 
or tripping over such dairy products andjor the glass con-
tainers therefore (sic) , and further informed the defendants 
and each of them that in the absence of plaintiffs, empty 
glass containers would be placed upon the back porch of said 
residence with a memorandum or note stating that no milk or 
dairy products were to be left; and the defendants and each 
of them (agreed to said req1test and) informed the plaintiff, 
Harold Madison Eads, and his said wife that none of said 
products or glass containers therefor would be left except 
within said refrigerator, and that empty glass containers 
would be removed by defendants from the back porch, and 
not left at said residence upon the reglllar delivery times; 
that on or about August 12, 1949, defendants and each of 
them negligently, carelessly and wrongfully placed, deposited, 
left, and permitted to remain a glass milk container upon the 
back porch of said residence, and the said minor plaintiff, 
picked up said container and fell off the [said] porch, causing 
the container to break within close proximity to his face; that 
as a direct and proximate result of the negligent and wrongful 
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acts of the defendants the said Rand Edison Eads was caused 
to suffer severe and permanent injuries, pain and suffering, 
all to his damage in the sum of $25,000.00. '' 
<i Defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint did 
\ not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and 
that it was uncertain in that it did not contain facts showing 
wherein any duty was owed to the minor plaintiff, in what 
manner any act or omission of defendant was a proximate 
cause of plaintiffs' injury, what consideration may have ex-
isted to support any agreement with any plaintiff for the re-
moval of empty bottles, whether defendants are charged· with 
placing or depositing the milk bottle on the porch or permit-
ting one to remain there, whether the milk container involved 
was full (as delivered by defendant) or empty (as having 
been in the possession of plaintiffs), whether defendant is 
charged with permitting the milk bottle to remain on the 
porch and whether the time was a "milk delivery time." 
The italicized portions of the complaint constitute the 
amendments made by plaintiffs. Although there is nothing 
in the record to substantiate the statement, plaintiffs contend 
that the amendments were made at the direction of the trial 
court upon the hearing and argument on the original 
complaint. 
Plaintiffs have alleged an agreement made with defendant 
and, implicit therein, is the allegation that it was made ex-
pressly for the benefit of their minor child, the third party 
beneficiary thereof. (Walsh v. Walsh, 42 Cal.App.2d 282, 
285 [108 P.2d 760]; LeBallister v. Redwood Theatres, Inc., 
1 Cal.App.2d 447 [36 P.2d 827] .) [la] It is true that no 
consideration for 'the contract was alleged, but that was a 
deficiency which plaintiffs might have been able to supply by 
amendment. The consideration for such agreement may well 
have been the plaintiffs' promise to continue to buy dairy 
products from defendant rather than from another firm. · 
Assuming that there was a valid agreement for the benefit 
of plaintiffs' minor child, defendant next contends that plain-
tiffs have no cause of action in tort for the failure to per-
form. [2] The same act may be both a tort and a breach of 
contract. (L. B. Labomtories, Inc. v. Mitchell, ant!3, pp. 56, 
62-63 [244 P.2d 385] .) [3] Even where there is a contrac-
tual relationship between the parties, a cause of action in tort 
may sometimes arise out of the liegligent ;manner in which 
the contractual duty is performed, or out of a failure to per-
form such duty. (Green v. Hanson, 103 Cal.App. 430 [284 
Oct.1952] EADs v. MA.Rxs 811 
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P. 1082]; Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251 [280 P. 942] ; Wetzel 
v. Pius, 78 Cal.App. 104 [248 P. 288].) [4] Here, the duty of 
care arose by reason of the contract, and plaintiff has sued 
in tort for the breach of that duty. The contract is of sig-
nificance only in creating the legal duty, and the negligence 
of the defendant should not be considered as a breach of con-
tract, but as a tort governed by tort rules. (Rushing v. Pick-
wick Stages Systern, 113 Cal.App. 240 [298 P. 150]; Basler 
v. Sacramento etc. Ry. Co., 166 Cal. 33 [134 P. 993] .) 
[5] As was said in Peterson v. Sherman, 68 Cal.App.2d 
706, 711 [157 P .2d 863] : "It has been well established in 
this state that if the cause of action arises from a breach 
of a promise set forth in the contract, the action is ex con-
tractu but if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of 
the contract it is ex delicto .... " (See, also, Jones v. Kelly, 
supra, 208 Cal. 251, 254-255.) [6] Where the cause of ac-
tion arises from the breach of a contractual duty, the action 
is delictual notwithstanding that it also involves a breach of 
contract. (Jones v. Kelly, supra; Peterson v. Sherman, 
s1tpra.) Defendants maintain that there can be no action in 
tort because there is no general duty of care arising out of 
the vendor-vendee relationship. In situations such as this, 
there is contractual ·negligence or the breach of a primary 
duty owed to the injured party, the duty arising ' out of 
the contract. [7] A tort may grow out of or be coincident 
with a contract, and the existence of a contractual relation-
ship does not immunize a tort feasor from tort liability for 
his wrongful acts in breach of the contract (Jones v. Kelly, 
supra, 208 Cal. 251' . [8] Contractual negligence ordinarily 
gives rise to an action either on contract or in tort, and the 
injured party may at his election waive the contract and sue 
in tort (Loup v. Califo·rnia Southern R. R. Co., 63 Cal. 97, 99; 
Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124 [217 P.2d 113, 
17 A.L.R.2d 929]); or waive the tort and base his a,ction on 
the contract alone (Single.y v. Bigelow, 108 Cal.App. 436, 444 
[291 P. 899]; L . B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, supra, ante, 
p. 56; 1 Cal.Jur.2d, Actions, § 29). [9] In general, however, it 
has been held that actions based on negligent failure to per-
form contractual duties, such as those owing from a hospital 
(Harding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177 Cal. 520 [171 P. 98]) 
or physician (Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000]) 
to a patient, from an employer to an employee (Krebenios v. 
Lindauer, 17 5 Cal. 431 [ 166 P. 17] ) , fro in a landlord to a 
tenant (Jones v. Kelly, supra) although containmg elements 
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of both contract and tort, are regarded as delictual actions, 
since negligence is considered the gravamen of the action. 
[lOa.] Defendant contends that the complaint is insufficient 
in that there is nothing to show what act or omission attribu-
table to it was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained 
by the minor plaintiff. Plaintiffs allege that defendants ''and 
each of them. negligently, carelessly and wrongfully placed, 
deposited, left, and permitted to remain a glass milk con-
tainer upon the back porch of said residence, and the said 
minor plaintiff, picked up said container and fell off the porch 
causing the container to break within close proximity to his 
face; that as a direct and proximate result of the negligent 
and wrongful acts of the defen:zts the said Rand Edison 
Eads was· caused to suffer'' etc Although the injury re-
sulted from the independent int rvening action of the child, 
such occurrence was readily foreseeable and should have been 
anticipated. [11] Where the intervening act is reasonably 
foreseeable, the chain of causation is not broken, and the m,oigi-
nai actor remains liableLf (Mas..~l}y_ v . .Arden li!arms Oo., 26 
Cal.2d 213 [157 P .2d 37f, 158 A.L.R. 872] ; Osborn v. City of 
Whittier, 103 Cal.App.2d 609 [230 ·p .2d 132].) Here, the 
precise injury occurred which plaintiffs, by their agreement, 
sought to prevent. 
[lOb] Taking the allegations o£ the complaint as true, as we 
are bound to do (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 
Cal.2d 34, 41 [ 172 P .2d 867]), it is our opinion that the 
agreement between plaintiffs and defendant created a duty 
of care on the part of defendant toward plaintiffs' minor child, 
that plaintiffs properly sued in tort for the breach of that duty, 
and that there was a sufficient allegation that defendant's neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of the · child's injuries. 
[lb, 12] The other points raised by defendant in its demurr~r 
might have been obviated by amendment, and we are there-
fore of the opinion that the trial court abused its discretion 
in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.. .As this 
court said in We'll.nerholrn v. Stanford University School of 
Medicine, 20 Cal.2d ·713, 718, 719 [128 P.2d ;522, 141 A.L.R. 
1358] : "Where a complaint is sufficient against a general 
demurrer, however, .and any uncertainties or ambiguities in 
the pleading can be corrected by amendment, it is apparent 
that denial of leave to amend results in a disposition of the 
cause upon technical grounds alone. The plaintiff who has 
stated a cause of action in such a case is denied a trial on the 
merits of his action if any of the grounds of special demurr.er 
Oct.1952] SERVE YoURSELF GAs ETa. AssN. v. BROCK 
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is well taken, despite the fact that the deficiencies can be 
corrected. It has been held, under such circumstances, that 
denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion 
even though it be conceded that the trial court had authority 
to sustain the special demurrer because of defects in the form 
of pleading (Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97, 
104 [114 P.2d 1] ; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 579 [122 
P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328], and cases cited therein) .... " 
Wilkerson v. Seib, 20 Cal.2d 556 127 P.2d 904] ; Photockart 
v. Del R1:cdo, 94 Cal.App.2d 315 [210 P.2d 547]; Davis v. 
Wood, 61 Cal.App.~d 788 [143 P.2d 740]. 
We therefore hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. 
We do not decide, however, that the complaint was not subject 
to special demurrer, and the trial court may in its discretion 
require the clarification of uncertainties or ambiguities in the 
complaint. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J ., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
,J., and Spence, J., C<?ncurred. 
[L . .A.. No. 21968. In Bank. Oct. 31, 1952.] 
SERVE YOURSELF GASOLINE STATIONS ASSOCIA-
TION, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, v. A. A. BROCK, as Director of the Department 
of Agriculture et al., Respondents; URICH'S SERVE 
YOURSELF STATIONS, INCORPORATED (a Cor-
poration) et al., Interveners and Appellants. 
[1] Constitutional Law-Police Power-Legislative Discretion and 
Court Review.-In reviewing legislation for the purpose of 
testing its propriety as an exercise of the police power, the 
power of the court is limited to determining whether the sub-
ject of the legislation is within the state's power, and if so 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 116; Am.Jur., Constitu-
tional Law, § 305. 
McK. Dig, References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 107; [2] Con-
stitutional Law, §56; [3, 6, 7, 9-11, 15, 16] Garage Keepers, § 1a; 
[4] .Advertisements, § 5; [5] Constitutional Law, § 98; [8] Con-
stitutional Law, § 61; [12] Constitutional Law, § 144; [13] Con-
stitutional Law, § 140; [14] Constitutional Law, § 156. 
